Designing insurance markets with moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
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Recommendations
- On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1351867 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Competitive Model of Commodity Differentiation
- A model of equilibrium with differentiated commodities
- A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
- Competitive equilibria with asymmetric information
- Information-constrained optima with retrading: an externality and its market-based solution
- Markets and contracts
- On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
- Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Cited in
(9)- Dispersed initial ownership and the efficiency of the stock market under moral hazard
- Nonlinear incentive provision in Walrasian markets: a Cournot convergence approach
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 764442 (Why is no real title available?)
- A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard
- Competitive equilibrium with moral hazard in economies with multiple commodities.
- Optimal reinsurance with multiple tranches
- Insurance contracts and financial markets
- Dynamic consistency of insurance contracts under enforcement by exclusion
- Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance
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