Designing insurance markets with moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
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Publication:324364
DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0911-XzbMATH Open1367.91105OpenAlexW2140147556MaRDI QIDQ324364FDOQ324364
Paolo Siconolfi, Alessandro Citanna
Publication date: 11 October 2016
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0911-x
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Cites Work
- A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A model of equilibrium with differentiated commodities
- On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
- Competitive equilibria with asymmetric information
- Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
- A Competitive Model of Commodity Differentiation
- Markets and contracts
- Information-constrained optima with retrading: an externality and its market-based solution
Cited In (8)
- Dynamic consistency of insurance contracts under enforcement by exclusion
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal reinsurance with multiple tranches
- Nonlinear incentive provision in Walrasian markets: a Cournot convergence approach
- Dispersed initial ownership and the efficiency of the stock market under moral hazard
- A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard
- Competitive equilibrium with moral hazard in economies with multiple commodities.
- Insurance contracts and financial markets
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