Information-constrained optima with retrading: an externality and its market-based solution
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.11.001zbMATH Open1246.91071DBLPjournals/jet/KilenthongT11OpenAlexW2171750123WikidataQ41819707 ScholiaQ41819707MaRDI QIDQ548251FDOQ548251
Authors: Weerachart T. Kilenthong, Robert M. Townsend 
Publication date: 28 June 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/108265
Recommendations
private informationmoral hazarddecentralizationexternalitiesWalrasian equilibriumconstrained efficiencyretrading
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Cited In (7)
- Moral hazard and compensation packages: does reshuffling matter?
- Introduction to incompleteness and uncertainty in economics
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Rights to retrade, free-riding and insurance requirement
- Designing insurance markets with moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
- On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
- Optimal liquidity policy with shadow banking
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