Optimal liquidity policy with shadow banking

DOI10.1007/s00199-018-1152-6zbMath1443.91347OpenAlexW2893155287WikidataQ129195890 ScholiaQ129195890MaRDI QIDQ2305050

Yuzhe Zhang, Borys Grochulski

Publication date: 10 March 2020

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1152-6

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designliquidity regulationpecuniary externalityshadow bankinginterest on reservesilliquid-asset taxmaturity mismatchprivate retrade

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (2)

Deposit insurance and the coexistence of commercial and shadow banks ⋮ FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS

Cites Work

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• Inefficient Credit Booms
• Debt Constrained Asset Markets
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• Bailouts and Financial Fragility
• Shadow Banking and the Four Pillars of Traditional Financial Intermediation
• FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS

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