Recommendations
Cites work
- A theory of liquidity and regulation of financial intermediation
- Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
- Banking, incentive constraints, and demand deposit contracts with nonlinear returns
- Collateral restrictions and liquidity under-supply: a simple model
- Demand deposit contracts, suspension of convertibility, and optimal financial intermediation
- Deposit insurance and regulation in a Diamond-Dybvig banking model with a risky technology
- Financial intermediaries and markets.
- Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility
Cited in
(11)- Uniqueness and stability of equilibrium in economies with two goods
- Inefficient ownership and resale opportunities
- Optimal liquidity policy with shadow banking
- A theory of liquidity and regulation of financial intermediation
- Settlement Fund Circulation Problem
- Liquidity and market participation
- Liquidity and market participation
- Recent advances on uniqueness of competitive equilibrium
- Portfolio choice and settlement frictions: a theory of endogenous convenience yields
- The optimal quantity of money and partially-liquid assets
- Markets do not select for a liquidity preference as behavior towards risk
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