Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility

DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0899-2zbMATH Open1367.91112OpenAlexW2129164460MaRDI QIDQ255169FDOQ255169

Authors: Huberto M. Ennis, Todd Keister 

Publication date: 9 March 2016

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0899-2

Recommendations

• Demand deposit contracts, suspension of convertibility, and optimal financial intermediation
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zbMATH Keywords

bank runsdemand depositsliquidity insurancesequential service

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Cites Work

• Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation
• Optimal Diamond-Dybvig mechanism in large economies with aggregate uncertainty
• The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model
• Enriching information to prevent bank runs
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• A bank runs model with a continuum of types
• Bailouts and financial fragility
• Preventing bank runs
• Run theorems for low returns and large banks
• Noisy sunspots and bank runs
• Herding and bank runs
• Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation

Cited In (27)

• Introduction to the symposium on bubbles, multiple equilibria, and economic activities
• The effect of the central bank's standing facilities on interbank lending and bank liquidity holding
• Financial transparency and bank runs
• An incentive problem in the dynamic theory of banking.
• Demand deposit contracts, suspension of convertibility, and optimal financial intermediation
• On sunspots, bank runs, and Glass-Steagall
• Optimal bailouts, bank's incentive and risk
• Optimal intermediated investment in a liquidity-driven cycle
• Optimal Diamond-Dybvig mechanism in large economies with aggregate uncertainty
• Interest rates and financial fragility
• Money, financial stability and efficiency
• A model to analyse financial fragility
• Suspension of Convertibility versus Deposit Insurance: A Welfare Comparison
• LIQUIDITY PROVISION AND BANKING CRISES WITH HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS
• Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public
• On run-preventing contract design
• The optimal bailout policy in an interbank network
• Banking, incentive constraints, and demand deposit contracts with nonlinear returns
• A model of financial fragility
• Chained financial contracts and global banks
• Optimal banking with delegated monitoring
• A theory of liquidity and regulation of financial intermediation
• Inefficient liquidity provision
• Interacting information cascades: on the movement of conventions between groups
• Bank bailouts: moral hazard and commitment
• Increasing returns to scale and financial fragility
• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics

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