Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility

DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0899-2MaRDI QIDQ255169zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Huberto M. Ennis, Todd Keister

Publication date 9 March 2016

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0899-2

zbMATH Keywords

bank runsdemand depositsliquidity insurancesequential service

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Recommendations

• Demand deposit contracts, suspension of convertibility, and optimal financial intermediation
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Cites work

• A bank runs model with a continuum of types
• Bailouts and financial fragility
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Enriching information to prevent bank runs
• Herding and bank runs
• Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation
• Noisy sunspots and bank runs
• Optimal Diamond-Dybvig mechanism in large economies with aggregate uncertainty
• Preventing bank runs
• Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation
• Run theorems for low returns and large banks
• The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model

Cited in

(27)

• A model of financial fragility
• Optimal bailouts, bank's incentive and risk
• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
• The optimal bailout policy in an interbank network
• A theory of liquidity and regulation of financial intermediation
• Optimal Diamond-Dybvig mechanism in large economies with aggregate uncertainty
• A model to analyse financial fragility
• Interest rates and financial fragility
• Inefficient liquidity provision
• Suspension of Convertibility versus Deposit Insurance: A Welfare Comparison
• LIQUIDITY PROVISION AND BANKING CRISES WITH HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS
• Banking, incentive constraints, and demand deposit contracts with nonlinear returns
• The effect of the central bank's standing facilities on interbank lending and bank liquidity holding
• An incentive problem in the dynamic theory of banking.
• Introduction to the symposium on bubbles, multiple equilibria, and economic activities
• Financial transparency and bank runs
• Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public
• Money, financial stability and efficiency
• On sunspots, bank runs, and Glass-Steagall
• Interacting information cascades: on the movement of conventions between groups
• Chained financial contracts and global banks
• Bank bailouts: moral hazard and commitment
• Increasing returns to scale and financial fragility
• Optimal banking with delegated monitoring
• Optimal intermediated investment in a liquidity-driven cycle
• On run-preventing contract design
• Demand deposit contracts, suspension of convertibility, and optimal financial intermediation

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