Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public

DOI10.3982/TE5178MaRDI QIDQ6194366zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Xuesong Huang

Publication date 19 March 2024

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te5178

zbMATH Keywords

bank runspublic informationforward inductioncorrelated typessophisticated contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs
• Currency stability using blockchain technology
• Discussion of: ``Currency stability using blockchain technology
• Enriching information to prevent bank runs
• Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation
• Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
• Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility
• Preventing bank runs
• Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
• The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model

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