Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.07.011zbMath1153.91638OpenAlexW2128866875MaRDI QIDQ950997

Ed Nosal, David Andolfatto

Publication date: 29 October 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.011

zbMATH Keywords

bank runsbank contractsprivate record keepingself-interested banker

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (8)

Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation ⋮ Discussion of: ``Currency stability using blockchain technology ⋮ On run-preventing contract design ⋮ Bank bailouts: moral hazard and commitment ⋮ Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public ⋮ Introduction to monetary and macro economics ⋮ Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures ⋮ Bank runs with many small banks and mutual guarantees at the terminal stage

Cites Work

• Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary
• Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation
• The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring

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