Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs
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Publication:950997
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.07.011zbMATH Open1153.91638OpenAlexW2128866875MaRDI QIDQ950997FDOQ950997
Authors: David Andolfatto, Ed Nosal 
Publication date: 29 October 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.011
Recommendations
- Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
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- Banking, incentive constraints, and demand deposit contracts with nonlinear returns
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Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)
Cites Work
- Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation
- The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model
- Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
- Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
- Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary
Cited In (21)
- Bank runs with many small banks and mutual guarantees at the terminal stage
- Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility
- Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures
- A bank runs model with a continuum of types
- Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation
- Financial transparency and bank runs
- An incentive problem in the dynamic theory of banking.
- Noisy sunspots and bank runs
- Optimal bailouts, bank's incentive and risk
- Optimal Diamond-Dybvig mechanism in large economies with aggregate uncertainty
- Why banks should keep secrets
- The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model
- Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public
- On run-preventing contract design
- Discussion of: ``Currency stability using blockchain technology
- Incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankcruptcy constraints
- Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
- Runs, panics and bubbles: Diamond-Dybvig and Morris-Shin reconsidered
- Banking, incentive constraints, and demand deposit contracts with nonlinear returns
- Bank bailouts: moral hazard and commitment
- Introduction to monetary and macro economics
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