Why banks should keep secrets

DOI10.1007/S00199-004-0597-YMaRDI QIDQ2580966zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Todd R. Kaplan

Publication date 10 January 2006

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10036/24456

zbMATH Keywords

deposit contractsinterim information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Stress tests and information disclosure
• Optimal disclosure policy and undue diligence
• Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs
• Banking, incentive constraints, and demand deposit contracts with nonlinear returns
• Opaque bank assets and optimal equity capital

Cited in

(6)

• Security design with interim public information
• Efficient dark markets
• Communication of preferences in contests for contracts
• Verifiable disclosure
• Inside money, fraud and self-fulfilling liquidity dry-up
• On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships

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