Verifiable disclosure

DOI10.1007/S00199-017-1048-XMaRDI QIDQ722620zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jeremy Bertomeu, Davide Cianciaruso

Publication date 27 July 2018

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1048-x

zbMATH Keywords

verificationdisclosureunravelingsanitationtruthfuluncertain information endowment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Evidence disclosure and verifiability
• Minimum disclosure proofs of knowledge
• Verification
• Full revelation under optional verification
• Transmission of verification
• Verifiably truthful mechanisms
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2043305
• Disclosure and choice

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
• Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
• Disclosures and Asset Returns
• Efficient dark markets
• Information revelation in competitive markets
• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• New, like new, or very good? Reputation and credibility
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
• Welfare reducing polls
• Why banks should keep secrets

Cited in

(18)

• Disclosure with unknown expertise
• When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
• Full revelation under optional verification
• Informational correlation and selective disclosure
• Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games
• Simple versus rich language in disclosure games
• Dynamic games of firm social media disclosure
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• Testing, disclosure and approval
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• Full revelation of expertise before disclosure
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2043305 (Why is no real title available?)
• Full disclosure in decentralized organizations
• Duty to read vs duty to disclose fine print. Does the market structure matter?
• Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions
• Strategic disclosure with reputational concerns
• The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure
• A model of gradual information disclosure

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