Duty to read vs duty to disclose fine print. Does the market structure matter?

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2020-0157OpenAlexW3216505869MaRDI QIDQ2690366FDOQ2690366

Authors: Elena D'Agostino, Marco Alberto De Benedetto, Giuseppe Sobbrio 

Publication date: 16 March 2023

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0157

Recommendations

• Optimal disclosure policy and undue diligence
• Vertically differentiated duopoly with unaware consumers
• Verifiable disclosure
• Consumer inattention and bill-shock regulation
• Disclosure, competition, and learning from asset prices

zbMATH Keywords

disclosureregulationmarket structurefine printreading cost

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Microeconomic theory
• Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Consumer inattention and bill-shock regulation

Cited In (1)

• Effectiveness of mandatory disclosure for consumer policy

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