Duty to read vs duty to disclose fine print. Does the market structure matter?

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2020-0157MaRDI QIDQ2690366zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Elena D'Agostino, Marco Alberto De Benedetto, Giuseppe Sobbrio

Publication date 16 March 2023

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0157

zbMATH Keywords

disclosurefine printmarket structurereading costregulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Recommendations

• Optimal disclosure policy and undue diligence
• Vertically differentiated duopoly with unaware consumers
• Verifiable disclosure
• Consumer inattention and bill-shock regulation
• Disclosure, competition, and learning from asset prices

Cites work

• Consumer inattention and bill-shock regulation
• Game theory
• Microeconomic theory
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets

Cited in

(1)

• Effectiveness of mandatory disclosure for consumer policy

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