The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure

DOI10.2307/2937794zbMATH Open0695.90028OpenAlexW2027339036MaRDI QIDQ3471808FDOQ3471808

Authors: Michael J. Fishman, Kathleen M. Hagerty 

Publication date: 1990

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2937794

Recommendations

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zbMATH Keywords

private informationpersuasion game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cited In (20)

• When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
• Data disclosure limitation as a decision problem
• On the effects of the degree of discretion in reporting managerial performance
• Strategic environmental disclosure: evidence from the DOE's voluntary greenhouse gas registry
• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
• Disclosure with unknown expertise
• Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions
• Verifiable disclosure
• Persuasion and dynamic communication
• Implementation with partial provability
• Disclosure and choice
• An informational rationale for action over disclosure
• Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters
• Rules with discretion and local information
• Optimal disclosure policy and undue diligence
• Testing, disclosure and approval
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• The interval structure of optimal disclosure

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