The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure

DOI10.2307/2937794MaRDI QIDQ3471808zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michael J. Fishman, Kathleen M. Hagerty

Publication date 1990

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2937794

zbMATH Keywords

private informationpersuasion game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Verifiable disclosure
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• Disclosure and choice

Cited in

(20)

• Data disclosure limitation as a decision problem
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
• The interval structure of optimal disclosure
• On the effects of the degree of discretion in reporting managerial performance
• Strategic environmental disclosure: evidence from the DOE's voluntary greenhouse gas registry
• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
• Disclosure with unknown expertise
• Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions
• Verifiable disclosure
• Persuasion and dynamic communication
• Implementation with partial provability
• Disclosure and choice
• Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters
• An informational rationale for action over disclosure
• Rules with discretion and local information
• Optimal disclosure policy and undue diligence
• Testing, disclosure and approval
• Stress tests and information disclosure

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