Testing, disclosure and approval

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105002MaRDI QIDQ2173085zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jacopo Bizzotto, Jesper Rüdiger, Adrien Vigier

Publication date 22 April 2020

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/4919632

zbMATH Keywords

disclosuretestinginformation acquisitioncertification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Certification and market transparency
• The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure
• Verifiable disclosure
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• Disclosure and choice

Cites work

• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Certification and market transparency
• Competition in persuasion
• On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
• On the value of persuasion by experts
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Test Design Under Falsification
• Testing, disclosure and approval
• The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer

Cited in

(5)

• Hidden testing and selective disclosure of evidence
• Certification and market transparency
• Testing, disclosure and approval
• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
• Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition

This page was built for publication: Testing, disclosure and approval

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2173085)