Testing, disclosure and approval

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105002zbMATH Open1437.91268OpenAlexW2734467119MaRDI QIDQ2173085FDOQ2173085

Authors: Jacopo Bizzotto, Jesper Rüdiger, Adrien Vigier 

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/4919632

Recommendations

• Certification and market transparency
• The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure
• Verifiable disclosure
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• Disclosure and choice

zbMATH Keywords

disclosuretestinginformation acquisitioncertification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
• The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Competition in persuasion
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• On the value of persuasion by experts
• Test Design Under Falsification
• Testing, disclosure and approval
• Certification and market transparency

Cited In (5)

• Hidden testing and selective disclosure of evidence
• Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition
• Certification and market transparency
• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
• Testing, disclosure and approval

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