The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.019MaRDI QIDQ417632zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel Sgroi, David Gill

Publication date 14 May 2012

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.019

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian learningbiascertificationinformation transmissionmarketingproduct launchreviewersoft testtesttough test

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• New product launch: Herd seeking or herd preventing?
• Bayesian social learning from consumer reviews
• Welfare-improving cascades and the effect of noisy reviews
• Technical note: Signaling product quality through a trial period
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4035520

Cites work

• Belief-based refinements in signalling games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068103 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model
• Oligopolistic certification
• Optimizing information in the herd: Guinea pigs, profits, and welfare
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
• Sequential decisions with tests
• Sharing information in web communities
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
• The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
• The wisdom of the minority
• Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality

Cited in

(16)

• On the value of persuasion by experts
• Test design under voluntary participation
• Persuasion with costly precision
• Threshold tests as quality signals: optimal strategies, equilibria, and Price of anarchy
• Testing, disclosure and approval
• Experimental design to persuade
• Constrained persuasion with private information
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Project screening with tiered evaluation
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Delegated concept testing in new product development
• A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces
• Green bonds \& certification: is getting certified always optimal?
• Signaling through Bayesian persuasion
• Sequential decisions with tests
• Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model

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