The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.019zbMATH Open1258.91037OpenAlexW3126143661MaRDI QIDQ417632FDOQ417632

Authors: Daniel Sgroi, David Gill 

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.019

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zbMATH Keywords

biastestmarketingBayesian learninginformation transmissioncertificationproduct launchreviewersoft testtough test

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
• Optimizing information in the herd: Guinea pigs, profits, and welfare
• Sequential decisions with tests
• Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
• The wisdom of the minority
• Belief-based refinements in signalling games
• Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality
• Sharing information in web communities
• Oligopolistic certification

Cited In (14)

• Project screening with tiered evaluation
• Persuasion with costly precision
• Delegated concept testing in new product development
• A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces
• On the value of persuasion by experts
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Threshold tests as quality signals: optimal strategies, equilibria, and Price of anarchy
• Sequential decisions with tests
• Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model
• Constrained persuasion with private information
• Testing, disclosure and approval
• Experimental design to persuade
• Test design under voluntary participation

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