Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00098zbMath0946.91015OpenAlexW1997446671WikidataQ56429181 ScholiaQ56429181MaRDI QIDQ4262968

Curtis R. Taylor

Publication date: 25 October 2000

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00098

zbMATH Keywords

qualityinitial priceinspection outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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