Dynamic market for lemons with endogenous quality choice by the seller
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Publication:2442832
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Cites work
- Bargaining with common values
- Bargaining with Interdependent Values
- Efficient Sorting in a Dynamic Adverse-Selection Model
- Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons
- Sequential Bargaining with Correlated Values
- Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality
- Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem
- Waiting for news in the market for lemons
Cited in
(11)- Cycles and multiple equilibria in the market for durable lemons
- Multidimensional skin in the game
- Endogenous lemons markets and information cycles
- A scent of lemon -- seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation
- Search equilibrium with unobservable investment
- Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu
- Waiting for news in the market for lemons
- Nonexclusive competition in the market for lemons
- Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons
- Trading dynamics with private buyer signals in the market for lemons
- Selling a lemon under demand uncertainty
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