A scent of lemon -- seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation

DOI10.3390/G2010163MaRDI QIDQ2344971zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mark Voorneveld, Jörgen W. Weibull

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g2010163

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectiontwo-sided incomplete informationlemonsnoisy quality signals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1215267 (Why is no real title available?)
• Better may be worse: Some monotonicity results and paradoxes in discrete choice under uncertainty
• Sequential Equilibria
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values

Cited in

(14)

• The market strategies based on the dominant price
• A game theoretic foundation of competitive equilibria with adverse selection
• Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities
• The market for lemons and information theory
• Signalling, information and consumer fraud
• Waiting for news in the market for lemons
• Selling a lemon under demand uncertainty
• Dynamic market for lemons with endogenous quality choice by the seller
• Does risk aversion explain behavior in a lemon market?
• Job market signaling and employer learning
• Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu
• On price versus quality
• Overconfidence in the markets for lemons
• A game theoretical analysis of lemonizing cybercriminal black markets

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