A scent of lemon -- seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation
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Publication:2344971
DOI10.3390/g2010163zbMath1311.91104OpenAlexW2155703365MaRDI QIDQ2344971
Mark Voorneveld, Joergen W. Weibull
Publication date: 19 May 2015
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g2010163
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
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