A scent of lemon -- seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation
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Publication:2344971
DOI10.3390/G2010163zbMATH Open1311.91104OpenAlexW2155703365MaRDI QIDQ2344971FDOQ2344971
Authors: Mark Voorneveld, Jörgen W. Weibull
Publication date: 19 May 2015
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g2010163
Recommendations
Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44)
Cites Work
Cited In (14)
- Job market signaling and employer learning
- The market strategies based on the dominant price
- The market for lemons and information theory
- Signalling, information and consumer fraud
- A game theoretical analysis of lemonizing cybercriminal black markets
- Overconfidence in the markets for lemons
- Does risk aversion explain behavior in a lemon market?
- Waiting for news in the market for lemons
- On price versus quality
- Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities
- Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu
- Selling a lemon under demand uncertainty
- Dynamic market for lemons with endogenous quality choice by the seller
- A game theoretic foundation of competitive equilibria with adverse selection
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