A scent of lemon -- seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation

DOI10.3390/g2010163zbMath1311.91104OpenAlexW2155703365MaRDI QIDQ2344971

Mark Voorneveld, Joergen W. Weibull

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g2010163

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectiontwo-sided incomplete informationlemonsnoisy quality signals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (5)

Job market signaling and employer learning ⋮ Signalling, information and consumer fraud ⋮ A GAME THEORETIC FOUNDATION OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA WITH ADVERSE SELECTION ⋮ Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities ⋮ The market for lemons and information theory

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Better may be worse: Some monotonicity results and paradoxes in discrete choice under uncertainty
• Sequential Equilibria
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values

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