Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities
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Publication:1036565
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.005zbMath1180.91143OpenAlexW3123648455MaRDI QIDQ1036565
Fabrizio Adriani, Luca G. Deidda
Publication date: 13 November 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.005
signalingprice rigiditiestwo-sided asymmetric informationmarket for lemonsmarket breakdownprofessional bodies
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items
Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers, Signalling, information and consumer fraud, Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities, The market for lemons and information theory
Cites Work
- Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?
- Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities
- Belief-based refinements in signalling games
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- A scent of lemon -- seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation
- Auction and the informed seller problem
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
- Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
- Arm's Length Relationships