Belief-based refinements in signalling games
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Publication:1308805
DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1043zbMath0788.90082OpenAlexW1998992927MaRDI QIDQ1308805
George J. Mailath, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Andrew Postlewaite
Publication date: 10 December 1993
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1043
signalling gamesrefinementgames of incomplete informationsequential equilibriaundefeated equilibrium
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