Signaling covertly acquired information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6139974
Recommendations
Cites work
- Belief-based refinements in signalling games
- Certification and market transparency
- Contracts and productive information gathering
- Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Game theory
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Job market signaling and employer learning
- Market signaling with grades
- Noisy signaling in discrete time
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Optimal auctions with information acquisition
- Prices as Signals of Product Quality
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Signaling private choices
- Signalling to Experts
- Signalling to dispersed shareholders and corporate control
- Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
- Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
- The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
- Waiting for news in the market for lemons
This page was built for publication: Signaling covertly acquired information
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6139974)