Signaling covertly acquired information
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Publication:6139974
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105746MaRDI QIDQ6139974FDOQ6139974
Publication date: 19 January 2024
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:658
Cites Work
- Game theory
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Optimal auctions with information acquisition
- Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
- Contracts and productive information gathering
- Noisy signaling in discrete time
- Belief-based refinements in signalling games
- Waiting for news in the market for lemons
- Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Market signaling with grades
- Job market signaling and employer learning
- Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
- Prices as Signals of Product Quality
- Signaling Private Choices
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Signalling to Dispersed Shareholders and Corporate Control
- Signalling to Experts
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