Optimal auctions with information acquisition
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5178094 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4035521 (Why is no real title available?)
- Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
- Contracts and productive information gathering
- Contracts with endogenous information
- Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales
- Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Optimal search auctions
- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
- Participation costs and efficient auctions
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
- Stochastic orders
- Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
- Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
- The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
- The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
Cited in
(51)- Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed
- Hybrid auctions revisited
- Try before you buy: a theory of dynamic information acquisition
- Information design in optimal auctions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4035521 (Why is no real title available?)
- Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
- Optimal search auctions
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline
- Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
- Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
- Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs
- Optimal auctions with simultaneous and costly participation
- Buyer-optimal extensionproof information
- Auction and the informed seller problem
- Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
- Auctions with costly information acquisition
- Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach
- A nearly optimal auction for an uninformed seller
- Information elicitation for Bayesian auctions
- Information acquisition during a descending auction
- Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities
- Competitive contracts with productive information gathering
- Optimal advertising of auctions
- Monopoly insurance and endogenous information
- Auctions with dynamic costly information acquisition
- Information, stochastic dominance and bidding: the case of treasury auctions
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
- Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions
- Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders
- Signaling covertly acquired information
- Does more information-gathering effort raise or lower the average quantity produced?
- The role of optimal threats in auction design
- Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
- Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition
- Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert
- Auctions with flexible information acquisition
- On Revenue Maximization for Agents with Costly Information Acquisition
- Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information
- Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning
- Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions
- Contracts with endogenous information
- On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers
- Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract
- Pessimistic information gathering
- Endogenous information and stochastic contracts
- Optimal contest design: tuning the heat
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
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