Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.11.015MaRDI QIDQ665452zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel Krähmer

Publication date 5 March 2012

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37397

zbMATH Keywords

correlationmechanism designauctionfull surplus extractionex ante investment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5135703 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
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• Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design
• On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible
• Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
• The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design

Cited in

(3)

• Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types
• Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
• The role of optimal threats in auction design

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