Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.10.010zbMath1296.91126MaRDI QIDQ2444696

Alia Gizatulina, Martin F. Hellwig

Publication date: 10 April 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6E0E-2

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism design; belief functions; correlated information; abstract type spaces; BDP property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B44: Economics of information

28A33: Spaces of measures, convergence of measures

60B10: Convergence of probability measures

Related Items

Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents, Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types, Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces, Mechanism design with information acquisition, The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces, Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs

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