Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs
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Publication:2444696
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.10.010zbMath1296.91126MaRDI QIDQ2444696
Alia Gizatulina, Martin F. Hellwig
Publication date: 10 April 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6E0E-2
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B44: Economics of information
28A33: Spaces of measures, convergence of measures
60B10: Convergence of probability measures
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Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents, Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types, Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces, Mechanism design with information acquisition, The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces, Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs
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