Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
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Publication:2324797
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.05.009zbMath1457.91140OpenAlexW2948374689WikidataQ127744123 ScholiaQ127744123MaRDI QIDQ2324797
Publication date: 12 September 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.05.009
individual rationalitybudget balancecorrelated beliefsfull surplus extractionambiguous transfersBayesian (partial) implementation
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Incentive compatibility under ambiguity ⋮ Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence ⋮ Maxmin implementation ⋮ Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation
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