Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1876661
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.07.001zbMath1073.91047OpenAlexW2097612156MaRDI QIDQ1876661
Louis-André Gérard-Varet, Claude d'Aspremont, Jacques Crémer
Publication date: 20 August 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/2377/1/Cremer_2377.pdf
Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (9)
Mechanism design with information acquisition ⋮ Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance ⋮ Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus ⋮ Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types ⋮ A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces ⋮ Optimal crowdfunding design
Cites Work
- Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
- Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
- Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
- Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures
- Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance
- Knowledge as a public good: Efficient sharing and incentives for development effort
- A note on Matsushima's regularity condition
- Uncertainty, Asymmetric Information and Bilateral Contracts
- Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
- Incentives in Teams
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
- Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
This page was built for publication: Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
