A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types

DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0347-7zbMath1159.91374OpenAlexW3125226080MaRDI QIDQ1014325

Tilman Börgers, Peter Norman

Publication date: 27 April 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/2560/1/2560.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (11)

An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments ⋮ Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement ⋮ Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms ⋮ Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects ⋮ Proportional individual rationality and the provision of a public good in a large economy ⋮ Group efforts when performance is determined by the ``best shot ⋮ Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods ⋮ Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement ⋮ On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
• Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
• Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
• Auction design with a risk averse seller
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Efficient Auctions

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