Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
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Publication:2402058
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.001zbMath1400.91222OpenAlexW3122262801MaRDI QIDQ2402058
Publication date: 6 September 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-58039-6
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