Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
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Publication:1190249
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90088-YzbMATH Open0761.90025MaRDI QIDQ1190249FDOQ1190249
Authors: Dilip Mookherjee, Stefan Reichelstein 
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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multiple equilibriamechanism designauctionsdominant strategiesbilateral bargainingunique implementationintrafirm resource allocationprocurement contracting
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Cited In (41)
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- Dominant strategy implementation in a large population public goods game
- Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
- On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem
- Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality
- Mixed bundling auctions
- Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints
- Optimal combinatorial mechanism design
- Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
- A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
- (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)
- Optimal multi-unit combinatorial auctions
- Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers
- Optimal collusion with internal contracting
- Stopping agents from ``cheating
- Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
- Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation in the independent private-values model
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- Extremal incentive compatible transfers
- On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types
- Mechanism design with a restricted action space
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and deterministic dominant strategy implementation
- Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
- Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Dominant strategy implementation in multi-unit allocation problems
- Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
- Calendar mechanisms
- Optimal monopoly mechanisms with demand uncertainty
- Incentive compatibility and informational requirements
- Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions
- Banning bidders from all-pay auctions
- The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
- A note on optimal allocation with costly verification
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
- Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments
- Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms
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