On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2018936
DOI10.1007/s10951-014-0378-9zbMath1310.90052MaRDI QIDQ2018936
Jelle Duives, Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz, Birgit Heydenreich, Debasis Mishra
Publication date: 26 March 2015
Published in: Journal of Scheduling (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10951-014-0378-9
90B36: Stochastic scheduling theory in operations research
68M20: Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
Randomized mechanism design for decentralized network scheduling, Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems, Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs, Balanced implementability of sequencing rules, Incentives and justice for sequencing problems, Optimal Mechanism Design for a Sequencing Problem with Two-Dimensional Types
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
- Optimization and mechanism design
- Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
- An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- Sequencing games
- Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
- On the balancedness of multiple machine sequencing games
- Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
- On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation
- Bayesian and Dominant-Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private-Values Model
- Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines That Depend on Processing Time
- Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
- Optimal Auction Design
- Incentives in Teams
- Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
- Two Dimensional Optimal Mechanism Design for a Sequencing Problem
- On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting, and Transferring of Jobs
- Optimal Mechanisms for Single Machine Scheduling
- Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
- Mechanism design in queueing problems
