On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem

DOI10.1007/s10951-014-0378-9zbMath1310.90052OpenAlexW2133880097MaRDI QIDQ2018936

Jelle Duives, Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz, Birgit Heydenreich, Debasis Mishra

Publication date: 26 March 2015

Published in: Journal of Scheduling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10951-014-0378-9

zbMATH Keywords

schedulingcombinatorial optimizationauctionmechanismeconomics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic scheduling theory in operations research (90B36) Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems (68M20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Incentives and justice for sequencing problems ⋮ Optimal Mechanism Design for a Sequencing Problem with Two-Dimensional Types ⋮ Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems ⋮ Randomized mechanism design for decentralized network scheduling ⋮ Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs ⋮ Balanced implementability of sequencing rules

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