On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem
DOI10.1007/S10951-014-0378-9zbMATH Open1310.90052OpenAlexW2133880097MaRDI QIDQ2018936FDOQ2018936
Jelle Duives, Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz, Birgit Heydenreich, Debasis Mishra
Publication date: 26 March 2015
Published in: Journal of Scheduling (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10951-014-0378-9
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems (68M20) Stochastic scheduling theory in operations research (90B36)
Cites Work
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Cited In (12)
- Optimal sequencing of contract algorithms
- Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective
- Randomized mechanism design for decentralized network scheduling
- Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
- Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs
- Optimal Mechanism Design for a Sequencing Problem with Two-Dimensional Types
- Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems
- Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
- Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
- Incentives and justice for sequencing problems
- Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
- Optimal Mechanisms for Single Machine Scheduling
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