On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation

From MaRDI portal
Publication:2857042

DOI10.3982/ECTA10592zbMath1274.91175OpenAlexW1719407338WikidataQ59938106 ScholiaQ59938106MaRDI QIDQ2857042

Benny Moldovanu, Alexey Kushnir, Xianwen Shi, Jacob K. Goeree, Alex Gershkov

Publication date: 31 October 2013

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10592




Related Items

Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domainsRevisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanismsInformed seller with taste heterogeneityReduced form implementation for environments with value interdependenciesEx-post optimal knapsack procurementAsymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctionsBalanced ranking mechanismsInformed principal problems in bilateral tradingStrength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agentsOptimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budgetOptimal Mechanism Design for a Sequencing Problem with Two-Dimensional TypesDominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environmentsOn linear transformations of intersectionsOptimal contingent delegationWithholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanismsSurplus extraction with rich type spacesOptimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public goodMechanism design with a restricted action spaceOptimal profit sharing mechanisms with type-dependent outside optionsOptimal allocation of an indivisible goodOn sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated typesOn optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problemDeterministic mechanisms, the revelation principle, and ex-post constraintsOn the equivalence of Bayesian and deterministic dominant strategy implementationRobust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition(No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cyclesOn the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilitiesGeneral competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishmentA note on optimal allocation with costly verificationOn the optimality of not allocatingOptimal Monopoly Mechanisms with Demand Uncertainty