Surplus extraction with rich type spaces

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.016zbMath1284.91172OpenAlexW3022449228MaRDI QIDQ2434246

Vitor Farinha Luz

Publication date: 5 February 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.016

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designprivate informationsurplus extractioncorrelated informationinformation rentspartial implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions ⋮ Surplus extraction with rich type spaces ⋮ (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)

Cites Work

• The relevance of private information in mechanism design
• Surplus extraction with rich type spaces
• On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation
• Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction
• Bayesian and Dominant-Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private-Values Model
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms

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