Robust Mechanism Design
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Publication:5393918
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00638.xzbMath1151.91327OpenAlexW3125985736MaRDI QIDQ5393918
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Publication date: 24 October 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00638.x
mechanism designcommon knowledgeuniversal type spacedominant strategiesex post equilibriumInterim equilibrium
Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)
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