Robust dynamic implementation
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Publication:893413
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.10.004zbMath1369.91056OpenAlexW2108823166MaRDI QIDQ893413
Publication date: 19 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.10.004
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Social choice (91B14)
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