Recommendations
Cites work
- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- An efficient dynamic mechanism
- Bayesian Implementation
- Belief in the opponents' future rationality
- Continuous implementation
- Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
- Efficient repeated implementation
- Higher order uncertainty and information: static and dynamic games
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Information-Invariant Equilibria of Extensive Games
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- On the structure of rationalizability for arbitrary spaces of uncertainty
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
- Robust predictions in infinite-horizon games -- an unrefinable folk theorem
- Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
- The dynamic pivot mechanism
Cited in
(44)- Credible implementation
- Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
- Approximate implementation in Markovian environments
- One-step-ahead implementation
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Limited focus in dynamic games
- Order independence for rationalizability
- Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
- Ex-post implementation with social preferences
- On non-monotonic strategic reasoning
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
- Information design in multistage games
- Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
- Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: a new proof for Battigalli's theorem
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
- Effective Incorporation of Double Look-Ahead Procedures
- Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
- Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
- Uncertain information structures and backward induction
- Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games
- Complexity and repeated implementation
- The robustness of robust implementation
- Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation
- On robust constitution design
- Time and Nash implementation
- Menu mechanisms
- Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
- A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
- A more credible approach to parallel trends
- A welfare analysis of occupational licensing in U.S. states
- Hazed and confused: the effect of air pollution on dementia
- IQ, expectations, and choice
- Optimal feedback in contests
- Save, spend, or give? A model of housing, family insurance, and savings in old age
- Stratification trees for adaptive randomisation in randomised controlled trials
- Testing the production approach to markup estimation
- Unemployment insurance in macroeconomic stabilization
- Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments
- Subgame-perfect implementation under information perturbations
- Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
- Robust coalitional implementation
- An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness
- An epistemic approach to stochastic games
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