One-step-ahead implementation
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Publication:2425196
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.04.007zbMath1417.91294OpenAlexW2946456205MaRDI QIDQ2425196
Takashi Hayashi, Michele Lombardi
Publication date: 26 June 2019
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/185047/7/185047.pdf
Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
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