One-step-ahead implementation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2425196
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.04.007zbMATH Open1417.91294OpenAlexW2946456205MaRDI QIDQ2425196FDOQ2425196
Authors: Takashi Hayashi, Michele Lombardi 
Publication date: 26 June 2019
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/185047/7/185047.pdf
Recommendations
- One-Step Improvement Ideas and Computational Aspects
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3848507
- Exact implementation
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- One-step ahead predictive fuzzy controller
- An efficient solution procedure for the ONE-STEP experiment
- Robust adaptive one-step ahead predictor
- One dimensional combination technique and its implementation
- Perfect implementation
- One-Step Consensus Solvability
Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Cites Work
- A course in game theory.
- Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations in a Sequence of Markets
- Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy
- On Equilibrium in Graham's Model of World Trade and Other Competitive Systems
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
- The dynamic pivot mechanism
- An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Politico-economic equilibrium and economic growth
- Implementation via backward induction
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Recursive Competitive Equilibrium: The Case of Homogeneous Households
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*
- Robust dynamic implementation
- Efficient repeated implementation
- Repeated implementation
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
- Repeated Nash implementation
- Dynamic contracting: An irrelevance theorem
- Implementation in partial equilibrium
Cited In (2)
This page was built for publication: One-step-ahead implementation
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2425196)
