One-step-ahead implementation

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.04.007MaRDI QIDQ2425196zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Takashi Hayashi, Michele Lombardi

Publication date 26 June 2019

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/185047/7/185047.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

implementationpartial equilibrium analysissubgame-perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A course in game theory.
• A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
• A new approach to the implementation problem
• An efficient dynamic mechanism
• Dynamic contracting: an irrelevance theorem
• Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
• Efficient repeated implementation
• Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy
• Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations in a Sequence of Markets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3827533 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation in partial equilibrium
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Implementation via backward induction
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
• On Equilibrium in Graham's Model of World Trade and Other Competitive Systems
• Politico-economic equilibrium and economic growth
• Recursive Competitive Equilibrium: The Case of Homogeneous Households
• Repeated implementation
• Repeated Nash implementation
• Robust dynamic implementation
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Subgame-perfect implementation under information perturbations
• The dynamic pivot mechanism
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium

Cited in

(2)

• Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents
• One-Step Improvement Ideas and Computational Aspects

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