Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents

DOI10.1007/S00355-020-01240-8zbMATH Open1454.91076OpenAlexW2779179513MaRDI QIDQ2217364FDOQ2217364

Authors: Helmuts Āzacis 

Publication date: 29 December 2020

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01240-8

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zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumsocial choice functionrepeated implementationagents' preferencesoverlapping generations of agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Sequential Equilibria
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
• Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players
• Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations
• Efficient repeated implementation
• Repeated implementation
• A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players
• Folk theorems in overlapping generations games
• Virtual repeated implementation
• Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
• Repeated Nash implementation
• One-step-ahead implementation

Cited In (1)

• Efficient repeated implementation

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