Complexity and repeated implementation
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Cites work
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- A crash course in implementation theory
- Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome
- Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs
- Complex Questionnaires
- Complexity and Competition
- Efficient repeated implementation
- Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
- Fault Tolerant Implementation
- Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
- Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle
- Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- On Repeated Games with Complete Information
- On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
- The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- The strength of a little perfection
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
Cited in
(7)- Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
- Approximate implementation in Markovian environments
- Efficient repeated implementation
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
- Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents
- Fighting collusion: an implementation theory approach
- Repeated implementation and complexity considerations
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