Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.03.009zbMATH Open1247.91059OpenAlexW2055559086MaRDI QIDQ634536FDOQ634536

Authors Rene Saran 

Publication date 16 August 2011

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.009

zbMATH Keywords

minimax regretrevelation principlemenu-dependent preferencesweak contraction consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Rationalizability of menu preferences
• Intransitive choices based on transitive preferences: The case of menu-dependent information
• Correction to: ``Rationalizability of menu preferences
• Sophistication and preference inconsistency in a menu utility representation
• Stochastic choice over menus
• Menu-dependent self-control
• Menu-dependent stochastic feasibility
• From revealed preference to preference revelation
• Rationality, external norms, and the epistemic value of menus
• Revealed preference and indifferent selection

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4091137 (Why is no real title available?)
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Internal Consistency of Choice
• Maximization and the Act of Choice
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• The Theory of Statistical Decision

Cited in

(17)

• Rationality, external norms, and the epistemic value of menus
• Behavioral strong implementation
• Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
• Mechanism design and intentions
• Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
• Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
• Nudge the lunch: a field experiment testing menu-primacy effects on lunch choices
• Symmetric mechanism design
• Complexity and repeated implementation
• Correction to: ``Rationalizability of menu preferences
• On the maximization of menu-dependent interval orders
• On the consistency of choice
• Implementation with a sympathizer
• Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent
• Rationalizability of menu preferences
• Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences
• Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals

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