Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle
From MaRDI portal
Publication:634536
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.009zbMath1247.91059OpenAlexW2055559086MaRDI QIDQ634536
Publication date: 16 August 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.009
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Mechanism design and intentions ⋮ Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade ⋮ Behavioral strong implementation ⋮ Behavioral implementation under incomplete information ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ Complexity and repeated implementation ⋮ Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences ⋮ On the consistency of choice ⋮ Symmetric mechanism design ⋮ Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading ⋮ Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
Cites Work
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Maximization and the Act of Choice
- Fault Tolerant Implementation
- Internal Consistency of Choice
- The Theory of Statistical Decision
- Rational Selection of Decision Functions
- Unnamed Item
