Behavioral implementation under incomplete information

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105738zbMATH Open1530.91082OpenAlexW2887692232MaRDI QIDQ6090463FDOQ6090463

Authors: Mehmet Barlo, Nuh Aygün Dalkıran 

Publication date: 17 November 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105738

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zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationbehavioral implementationbehavioral interim incentive efficiencyinterim implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• The Theory of Statistical Decision
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• A crash course in implementation theory
• Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
• Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Implementation in differential information economies
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• Bayesian Implementation
• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• Ex post implementation
• Implementation without rationality assumptions
• Epsilon-Nash implementation
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization
• Computational implementation
• Implementation via rights structures
• Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
• Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
• Weak implementation
• Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
• Implementation with a sympathizer
• Behavioral strong implementation

Cited In (1)

• Behavioral strong implementation

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