Behavioral implementation under incomplete information

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105738MaRDI QIDQ6090463zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mehmet Barlo, Nuh Aygün Dalkıran

Publication date 17 November 2023

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105738

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationbehavioral implementationbehavioral interim incentive efficiencyinterim implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Recommendations

• A new approach to the implementation problem
• Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
• Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1054714
• Behavioral strong implementation

Cites work

• A crash course in implementation theory
• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• Bayesian Implementation
• Behavioral strong implementation
• Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
• Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
• Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
• Computational implementation
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Epsilon-Nash implementation
• Ex post implementation
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Implementation via rights structures
• Implementation with a sympathizer
• Implementation without rationality assumptions
• Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions
• Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
• Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
• The Theory of Statistical Decision
• Weak implementation

Cited in

(2)

• Behavioral strong implementation
• Safe implementation

This page was built for publication: Behavioral implementation under incomplete information

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6090463)