Epsilon-Nash implementation

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2008.11.002MaRDI QIDQ1038089zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mehmet Barlo, Nuh Aygün Dalkıran

Publication date 17 November 2009

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

implementationepsilon-Nash equilibriumlimited veto powerMaskin-monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation

Cites work

• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies

Cited in

(8)

• Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
• The revelation approach to Nash implementation
• Implementation in generic environments
• Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
• Split it up to create incentives: investment, public goods and crossing the river
• Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
• Implementation with a sympathizer
• Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium

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