Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
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Recommendations
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
Cited in
(57)- Credible implementation
- Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- Nash implementation with little communication
- Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
- One-step-ahead implementation
- Implementation theory
- Nash implementation of the majority rule
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Incentives and competitive allocations in exchange economies with incomplete markets
- Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
- Implementation of voting operators
- Implementation via rights structures
- The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: an experimental comparison
- Cost sharing: Efficiency and implementation
- Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
- Implementation with partial provability
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Efficient allocation of a ``prize --- King Solomon's dilemma
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
- Economic juries and public project provision
- Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
- Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
- Public goods provision: Applying Jackson-Moulin mechanism for restricted agent characteristics
- Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
- Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
- Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
- The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
- Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
- Time and Nash implementation
- Natural implementation in public goods economies
- Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
- Implementation via backward induction
- Epsilon-Nash implementation
- Perfect Bayesian implementation
- Preference domains and the monotonicity of Condorcet extensions
- Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour
- Intersection of Nash implementable social choice correspondences
- Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Axiomatization and implementation via objections structures
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
- Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
- Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
- Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms
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