Implementation theory
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Cites work
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- A crash course in implementation theory
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Bayesian Implementation
- Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
- Contingent commodities and implementation
- Credible implementation
- Divide-and-permute
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria
- Dynamic provision of public goods
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Efficient repeated implementation
- Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- Equivalence of Nash implementability and robust implementability with incomplete information
- Existence and Nash implementation of efficient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology
- Fault Tolerant Implementation
- Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
- Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3887382 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3671968 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3215724 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation and Renegotiation
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Implementation in perfect equilibria
- Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence by market games
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
- Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Incentives in Teams
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation via Endowments
- Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Non-cooperative implementation of the core
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- On Nash-implementation in the presence of withholding
- On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
- On the generic existence of Radner equilibria when there are as many securities as states of nature
- On the generic impossibility of truthful behavior: A simple approach
- On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
- Optimal Auction Design
- Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation
- Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
- Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design
- Repeated implementation
- Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
- Revelation in informational dynamic settings
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
- Some Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implementation
- Stopping agents from ``cheating
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- The Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem: A simple proof
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- The possibility of efficient mechanisms for trading an indivisible object
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- The scholarship assignment problem
- The source of some paradoxes from social choice and probability
- The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- To merge or not to merge: that is the question
- Toward Natural Implementation
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Voluntary implementation
- Voting by Committees
- Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
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