Manipulation via Endowments
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(51)- Existence of equilibrium for Walrasian endowment games
- Private information in large economies
- Can everyone benefit from growth ? Two difficulties
- Are rational expectations really rational?
- Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
- The Lindahl solution with changing population and recsources
- Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies
- A top dog tale with preference complementarities
- Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
- Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
- Nash implementation in production economies
- Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods
- Non-manipulability vs. individual rationality in a permit sharing problem
- Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies
- Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market
- Recent studies of agent incentives in Internet resource allocation and pricing
- New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation
- Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences
- Household formation and markets
- Incentives in landing slot problems
- Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods
- Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments
- Coalition-enhancing fiscal policies in an open economy: a CES framework of Gale's transfer paradox
- The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies
- The incentive ratio in exchange economies
- STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS
- Let them cheat!
- Reaching Cournot-Walras equilibrium
- Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
- Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium
- Implementation theory
- Gradient differences and bilateral barters
- The \(n\)-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations
- Manipulation by reallocating initial endowments
- Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms
- Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
- On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation
- Constrained dictatorial rules are subject to variable-population paradoxes
- Allocation rules are very generally vulnerable to the strategic withholding of endowments
- Probabilistic verification in mechanism design
- Core is manipulable via segmentation
- Endowments-swapping-proof object reallocation with transfers
- Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
- General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions
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