General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions

DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0466-9zbMATH Open1195.91083OpenAlexW2088527897MaRDI QIDQ992053FDOQ992053

Authors: Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Georg Kirchsteiger 

Publication date: 8 September 2010

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-127568

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zbMATH Keywords

general equilibriumrationinglearning in gamesmarket clearing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

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• The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The logit-response dynamics
• Existence of an Exchange Equilibrium under Price Rigidities
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• Manipulation via Endowments
• On the finiteness of the number of critical equilibria, with an application to random selections
• Monopolistic behaviors and general equilibrium: A generalization of Nikaido's work
• GLOBAL BIFURCATIONS IN DUOPOLY WHEN THE COURNOT POINT IS DESTABILIZED VIA A SUBCRITICAL NEIMARK BIFURCATION
• Learning and market clearing: theory and experiments
• Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria
• Evolutionary choice of markets
• Real indeterminacy of equilibria and manipulability
• Manipulation via Withholding: A Generalization

Cited In (11)

• Local interactions under switching costs
• Myopic oligopoly pricing
• Optimal design of trade institutions
• Robust stochastic stability
• Market selection by boundedly-rational traders under constant returns to scale
• Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures
• Evolution of behavior when duopolists choose prices and quantities
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• Imitation by price and quantity setting firms in a differentiated market
• Trader matching and the selection of market institutions
• Learning and market clearing: theory and experiments

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