General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions
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Publication:992053
DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0466-9zbMath1195.91083OpenAlexW2088527897MaRDI QIDQ992053
Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Georg Kirchsteiger
Publication date: 8 September 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-127568
Related Items (9)
Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Imitation by price and quantity setting firms in a differentiated market ⋮ Market selection by boundedly-rational traders under constant returns to scale ⋮ Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures ⋮ Trader matching and the selection of market institutions ⋮ Local interactions under switching costs ⋮ Robust stochastic stability ⋮ Learning and market clearing: theory and experiments ⋮ Evolution of behavior when duopolists choose prices and quantities
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