Learning and market clearing: theory and experiments
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Publication:747344
DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0885-8zbMath1367.91070OpenAlexW594425727MaRDI QIDQ747344
Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Georg Kirchsteiger
Publication date: 23 October 2015
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0885-8
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Related Items (6)
Recursive equilibrium with price perfect foresight and a minimal state space ⋮ Market selection by boundedly-rational traders under constant returns to scale ⋮ Emergence of price-taking behavior ⋮ Trader matching and the selection of market institutions ⋮ The logit-response dynamics ⋮ General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions
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