Learning and market clearing: theory and experiments
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3493681 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1424768 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
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- Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
- Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
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- General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions
- How noise matters.
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- Regular quantal response equilibrium
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- Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
Cited in
(9)- Recursive equilibrium with price perfect foresight and a minimal state space
- Market selection by boundedly-rational traders under constant returns to scale
- Market efficiency and learning in an endogenously unstable environment
- Emergence of price-taking behavior
- Learning in a laboratory market with random supply and demand
- General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions
- Learning competitive equilibrium in laboratory exchange economies
- Trader matching and the selection of market institutions
- The logit-response dynamics
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