Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00429zbMath1152.91350OpenAlexW2083194543MaRDI QIDQ5472972

Publication date: 19 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.ifn.se/Wfiles/wp/WP534.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational methods in Markov chains (60J22) Markov chains (discrete-time Markov processes on discrete state spaces) (60J10) Large deviations (60F10) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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