Large deviations and stochastic stability in population games

DOI10.3934/JDG.2021021zbMATH Open1505.91087OpenAlexW3177763850MaRDI QIDQ2106071FDOQ2106071

Authors: Mathias Staudigl, Srinivas Arigapudi, William H. Sandholm 

Publication date: 8 December 2022

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2021021

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zbMATH Keywords

large deviationsMarkov chainsHamilton-Jacobi equationsstate-constrained optimal control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Large deviations (60F10) Markov chains (discrete-time Markov processes on discrete state spaces) (60J10) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cited In (8)

• Integration of large-deviation kernels and applications to large deviations for evolutionary games
• Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games
• Effects of players' random participation to the stability in LQ games
• Stability of equilibria for population games with uncertain parameters under bounded rationality
• Large population aggregative potential games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Population games with instantaneous behavior and the Rosenzweig-MacArthur model
• Large deviations and equilibrium selection in large populations

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