Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games
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Publication:894010
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.12.012zbMATH Open1330.91050OpenAlexW2025987514MaRDI QIDQ894010FDOQ894010
Authors: Daisuke Oyama, Satoru Takahashi 
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.012
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Cited In (11)
- Cost heterogeneity and the persistence of bilingualism
- Best response dynamics on random graphs
- Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice
- Unstable diffusion in social networks
- Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
- Large deviations and stochastic stability in population games
- Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics
- On the relationship between \(p\)-dominance and stochastic stability in network games
- Dynamics of diffusion on monoplex and multiplex networks: a message-passing approach
- A note on general epidemic region for infinite regular graphs
- Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under probit choice
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