Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games
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Publication:894010
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.012zbMath1330.91050OpenAlexW2025987514MaRDI QIDQ894010
Satoru Takahashi, Daisuke Oyama
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.012
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