An approach to equilibrium selection
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Publication:1893208
DOI10.1006/jeth.1995.1015zbMath0835.90121OpenAlexW1971306333MaRDI QIDQ1893208
Kiminori Matsuyama, Akihiko Matsui
Publication date: 3 July 1995
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1065.pdf
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A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION ⋮ Cyclical behavior of evolutionary dynamics in coordination games with changing payoffs ⋮ Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint-Shubik conjecture ⋮ Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in normal form games ⋮ Entropy-norm space for geometric selection of strict Nash equilibria in \(n\)-person games ⋮ \(p\)-best response set ⋮ Global analysis of an expectations augmented evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Distributed dynamic reinforcement of efficient outcomes in multiagent coordination and network formation ⋮ Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection ⋮ History as a coordination device ⋮ Gradient dynamics in population games: some basic results ⋮ ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY ⋮ Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games ⋮ Intertemporal coordination with delay options ⋮ Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games ⋮ Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection ⋮ Stochastically stable equilibria in \(n\)-person binary coordination games ⋮ Adaptive learning and \(p\)-best response sets ⋮ Perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives and time symmetry ⋮ Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example ⋮ The emergence of cooperation through leadership ⋮ Potential games with continuous player sets ⋮ On the observational equivalence of random matching ⋮ Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in \(N\)-player games ⋮ Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria ⋮ History versus expectations in economic geography reconsidered ⋮ Rationalizable foresight dynamics ⋮ Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time ⋮ Social pressure in networks induces public good provision ⋮ Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games ⋮ Is ambiguity aversion bad for innovation? ⋮ Dynamical systems with a continuum of randomly matched agents ⋮ Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria ⋮ Equilibrium selection via replicator dynamics in \(2 \times 2\) coordination games ⋮ Strategic stiffening/cooling in the Ising game ⋮ \(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics.
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