Stochastically stable equilibria in n-person binary coordination games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:419409
Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1396804 (Why is no real title available?)
- Adaptive learning and \(p\)-best response sets
- An approach to equilibrium selection
- Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
- Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
- Binary games with state dependent stochastic choice
- Conventional Contracts
- Equilibrium selection in \(n\)-person coordination games
- Finite Continuous Time Markov Chains
- How noise matters.
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- On the relationship between risk-dominance and stochastic stability
- Social Stability and Equilibrium
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- The Evolution of Conventions
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
Cited in
(10)- An analysis of stability sets in pure coordination games
- Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games
- Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
- Robust stochastic stability
- Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games
- Equilibrium selection in \(n\)-person coordination games
- Equilibrium selection in coordination games with simultaneous play.
- Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures
- \(n\)-person stochastic games with coalitions
- Adaptive play by idiosyncratic agents
This page was built for publication: Stochastically stable equilibria in \(n\)-person binary coordination games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q419409)
