Stochastically stable equilibria in n-person binary coordination games
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Publication:419409
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.08.007zbMATH Open1237.91013OpenAlexW2016166390MaRDI QIDQ419409FDOQ419409
Publication date: 18 May 2012
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.08.007
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Cited In (9)
- Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games
- Robust stochastic stability
- Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games
- Equilibrium selection in \(n\)-person coordination games
- Equilibrium selection in coordination games with simultaneous play.
- Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures
- \(n\)-person stochastic games with coalitions
- Adaptive play by idiosyncratic agents
- An analysis of stability sets in pure coordination games
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