Stochastically stable equilibria in \(n\)-person binary coordination games

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.08.007zbMath1237.91013OpenAlexW2016166390MaRDI QIDQ419409

Akira Okada, Toshimasa Maruta

Publication date: 18 May 2012

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.08.007

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (2)

Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures ⋮ Robust stochastic stability

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