Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
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Publication:4949573
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00119zbMATH Open0956.91027OpenAlexW2095803264MaRDI QIDQ4949573FDOQ4949573
Authors: Glenn Ellison 
Publication date: 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00119
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Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Contagion and efficiency
- Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets
- Constrained interactions and social coordination
- Coordination and culture
- Local interactions under switching costs
- An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
- Coordination between a sophisticated and fictitious player
- Evolution with changing mutation rates
- A bargaining approach to coordination in networks
- Stochastically stable equilibria in \(n\)-person binary coordination games
- Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency
- Adaptive learning and \(p\)-best response sets
- Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions
- Stochastic stability in best shot network games
- Bandwagon effects and long run technology choice
- Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
- Global vs. Local Information in (Anti-)Coordination Problems with Imitators
- Stochastic stability in networks with decay
- Robust stochastic stability
- Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature
- \(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics.
- Evolutionary game dynamics and the analysis of agent-based imitation models: the long run, the medium run and the importance of global analysis
- Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection
- Nestedness in networks: A theoretical model and some applications
- Stochastic stability and time-dependent mutations
- A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution.
- Imitation processes with small mutations
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations
- BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS IN A BIRTH-DEATH MODEL OF EVOLUTION IN GAMES
- Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms
- Rapid evolution under inertia
- Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies
- Fending off one means fending off all: evolutionary stability in quasi-submodular aggregative games
- Fixation times in deme structured, finite populations with rare migration
- Stochastic stability in one-way flow networks
- Escape dynamics and equilibria selection by iterative cycle decomposition
- Multi-scale metastable dynamics and the asymptotic stationary distribution of perturbed Markov chains
- Partial bandwagon effects and local interactions
- Endogenous networks, social games, and evolution
- Stochastic stability in a double auction
- Imitation and local interactions: long run equilibrium selection
- Why learning doesn't add up: Equilibrium selection with a composition of learning rules
- Coalitional stochastic stability
- Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
- Stochastic stability in the Scarf economy
- Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
- The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
- Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures
- Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks
- A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
- Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution
- Imitation with asymmetric memory
- Analysis and shifting of stochastically stable equilibria for evolutionary snowdrift games
- General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions
- \(p\)-best response set
- On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games.
- Adaptive play with spatial sampling.
- An evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma
- Social pressure in networks induces public good provision
- Imitation, local interaction, and coordination
- Competing conventions
- Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games
- Efficient online exchange via fiat money
- A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
- Trader matching and the selection of market institutions
- An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics
- Large deviations and equilibrium selection in large populations
- The logit-response dynamics
- Random matching in adaptive dynamics
- Learning and market clearing: theory and experiments
- Learning, bounded memory, and inertia
- Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics
- Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run
- Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation
- Homophily in network formation and social coordination
- Stochastic dynamics and Edmonds' algorithm
- Coordination problems on networks revisited: statics and dynamics
- The evolution of focal points
- Learning correlated equilibria in population games.
- Stable risk-sharing
- The evolution of free trade networks
- Lock-in through passive connections
- Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model
- Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games
- The emergence of cooperation through leadership
- Matching, imitation, and coordination in networks
- Network structures and poverty traps
- Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models
- Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
- Cournot competition, imitation, and information networks
- Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching
- Metastability of logit dynamics for coordination games
- Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
- The dynamics of norms and conventions under local interactions and imitation
- Dynamic games on arbitrary networks with two types of players
- Social coordination with locally observable types
- A hybrid revision protocol of action and links and social coordination
- Large deviations and stochastic stability in population games
- Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games.
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