Imitation processes with small mutations

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Publication:860357

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.006zbMath1142.91342OpenAlexW2119086496MaRDI QIDQ860357

Lorens A. Imhof, Drew Fudenberg

Publication date: 9 January 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3190369



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